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Sanchez-Dominguez v. State, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 10 (Feb. 27, 2014)1 
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: FELONY MURDER 
Summary 
 The Court determined two issues: (1) whether the felony murder rule applies to killings 
which occur only after all of the elements of the underlying felony are complete, and (2) whether 
the felony murder rule requires that a killing be caused by the commission of the underlying 
felony. 
Disposition 
 A killing need not take place before a felony is complete in order to qualify as felony 
murder. The statutory requirement that a felony murder be “committed in the perpetration or 
attempted perpetration of” certain felonies means simply that the felony and the killing must 
occur as part of the same continuous transaction. 
Factual and Procedural History 
 On November 13, 2009, Sanchez-Dominguez violated a temporary protective order by 
entering his wife’s mother’s home, uninvited, and asking to see his wife, who had recently left 
him. His wife’s relatives, including her mother, two brothers, and two cousins, told Sanchez-
Dominguez that his wife was not home and asked him to leave. He refused and continued to 
demand to see his wife. 
 When his wife’s cousin moved toward the telephone to call 911, Sanchez-Dominguez 
drew a gun, fixed it on the man, and ordered him not to move. He then pointed the gun at 
mother-in-law. At that point, his brother-in-law, Roberto, came downstairs and stood between his 
mother and Sanchez-Dominguez. Roberto said, “If you’re going to shoot, shoot.” Without 
hesitation, Sanchez-Dominguez shot Roberto in the chest from point-blank range, killing him. 
 Sanchez-Dominguez was convicted by a jury on the counts of burglary, aggravated 
stalking, and murder. The murder was charged as “willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, 
and alternatively, as felony murder in the perpetration of a burglary.” Sanchez-Dominguez was 
sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.  
Sanchez-Dominguez now asserts that the district court erred by giving incomplete 
instructions to the jury regarding felony murder, which permitted the jury to convict Sanchez-
Dominguez for felony murder based on a completed felony. 
Discussion 
The felony murder rule does not require that the killing occur before the completion of the 
elements of the underlying felony. 
                                                      
1  By Brady Briggs. 
2  NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030(1)(b) (2013). 
 Sanchez-Dominguez’s proffered jury instructions were premised on the incorrect notion 
that the duration of liability for felony murder cannot extend beyond the completion of the 
felony. Therefore, the district court did not err in refusing to submit his instructions to the jury.  
Nevada law defines first degree felony murder as “a killing that is ‘committed in the 
perpetration or attempted perpetration of’ certain felonies, including burglary.”2 Sanchez-
Dominguez proposed a strictly temporal construction of the phrase “in the perpetration of,” 
contending that once a felony is complete, a killing that occurs thereafter does not occur in the 
perpetration of that felony. Accordingly, because his burglary was complete “once he had 
entered the family home with the specific intent to commit a felony,” he did not kill Roberto in 
the perpetration of the burglary. 
Rooted in the common law, the phrase “in the perpetration of” has been uniformly 
interpreted by numerous state courts since the late 19th century.3 Those interpretations suggest 
that felony murder applies to any killing which occurs within the res gestae of a felony, meaning 
before the suspect reaches a place of relative safety from law enforcement. Therefore, “the 
perpetration of a felony does not end the moment all of the statutory elements of the felony are 
complete. Instead, the duration of the felony-murder liability can extend beyond the termination 
of the felony itself if the killing and the felony are part of a continuous transaction.” 
 Accordingly, the Court rejected the argument that a killing which occurs after a burglary 
is complete cannot be appropriately classified as felony murder. In the case of Sanchez-
Dominguez, the killing occurred only moments after the burglary was complete, “while Sanchez-
Dominguez remained in the family home uninvited.” This is sufficient to support the jury’s 
guilty verdict. 
A killing need not be caused by the commission of the underlying felony to fall under the felony 
murder rule. 
 Sanchez-Dominguez also argued that Nevada’s felony murder statute requires a separate 
element of direct and immediate causation. However, the Court observed that all that causation 
requires in a felony murder case is “that the felony and the killing be part of a continuous 
transaction.”4 The felony murder rule is premised on strict liability for killings which occur as a 
result of the commission of a felony, whether that killing is intentional or accidental. Therefore, 
causation is assumed in the event of an accidental killing, so long as the killing “would not have 
occurred but for the perpetrator’s purposeful decision to cause a felony.” 
 Here, the Court determined that Roberto’s death would not have occurred but for 
Sanchez-Dominguez’s choice to commit burglary. Moreover, Roberto’s decision to defend his 
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family was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the burglary. Therefore, causation was 
established in this case. 
Conclusion 
 A felony murder may occur after the felony upon which it is premised is completed, so 
long as the killing occurs within the res gestae of the felony. Moreover, the felony murder rule’s 
causation requirement is satisfied where the killing would not have occurred but for the 
commission of the felony. In short, all that is truly required is that the felony and the killing 
occur as part of a continuous transaction. Here, the burglary and the killing occurred as part of 
one continuous transaction. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Sanchez-Dominguez’s conviction. 
  
 
